Florida Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 1

Article 3

March 1960

Florida's Unique Dismissal–The Nonsuit
C. Parkhill Mays Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
C. Parkhill Mays Jr., Florida's Unique Dismissal–The Nonsuit, 13 Fla. L. Rev. 105 (1960).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Mays: Florida's Unique Dismissal–The Nonsuit

NOTES
FLORIDA'S UNIQUE DISMISSAL - THE NON-SUIT
Judging from the conflicting case opinions portraying the various
uses and constructions of Florida's non-suit, a survey and analysis
of this concept, designed to reduce in so far as possible some of the
unfamiliarity with this area, is in order.
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are to a great extent a
duplication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and are very
similar in their effect and objectives. There are, however, express
variations between the two, which obtain vastly different results in
the same field of law. One such change in the Florida rules is in
the area of dismissal and non-suit. The federal rules do not contain
provisions for non-suit but rather provide for an end to litigation
by motion for dismissal.: By this rule the plaintiff is allowed to
dismiss his case once if his petition is filed before the defendant
answers or moves for summary judgment, without the dismissal being
a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. This rule is
appropriately referred to as the "two-dismissal" rule, since without
an order by the court to the contrary or a stipulation between the
parties a prior voluntary dismissal will make a subsequent one an
adjudication upon the merits. 2 Federal Rule 41 (b) further provides

that a defendant may move to dismiss the plaintiff's case upon facts
and law and that the dismissal, except in the case of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue or upon court order, shall operate as an
adjudication upon the merits.
Florida Rule 1.35 is very similar in effect to Federal Rule 41. The
main variation between the two is the addition to Rule 1.35 (b) of
the clause, "except, however, that nothing stated herein shall preclude
a non-suit from being taken pursuant to any applicable statute."
Section 54.09 of Florida Statutes 1959 provides that "no plaintiff shall
take a non-suit on trial unless he do so before the jury retire from
the bar." This statute as construed by the courts provides a plaintiff
with an absolute right to a non-suit, abridged only by the limitation
3
that the non-suit must be taken before the jury retires from the bar.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a).
2Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc., 96 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1957); 65 A.L.R.2d
637.
3E.g., Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., infra note 5; Pitt v. Abrams,
103 Fla. 1022, 139 So. 152 (1931).
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Perhaps one of the most unsettled and controversial questions in
Florida law today is just how "absolute" this right of non-suit really
is. Since the rules and statutes are silent as to the extent and breadth
of this concept, a thorough search into Florida common law is necessary in order to understand its full consequences.
At early common law, non-suit was classified as a dismissal of
the plaintiff's cause, looking to an arrest of the trial but leaving the
merits undetermined.4 It was said that a non-suit must always be
voluntary, and in no case could it be adverse to the plaintiff or without his implied consent. Thus the only non-suit known at common
law was classified as voluntary. A leading Florida case 5 recognized
a part of this common law approach by stating that to set aside a
voluntary non-suit would require the plaintiff to prosecute without
his consent, which could not be done. However, the Court also
recognized a Florida expansion of the common law doctrine to include
the involuntary non-suit. Thus Florida law seemingly recognizes the
privilege of the plaintiff to a voluntary non-suit, interlocutory in
character, leaving the merits undetermined; but it goes a step further
than the common law and recognizes the creation of an involuntary
non-suit classified as such solely in relation to the circumstances under
which it is ordered. Thus a non-suit requested by the plaintiff under
such circumstances that he would otherwise be precluded from recovery would be an involuntary non-suit,6 although it would not
actually be forced upon him. An excellent example is furnished by
J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-CarolinaChemical Corp.,7 in which the
plaintiff asked for and received a non-suit after the announcement by
the Court that it would direct a verdict for the defendant. The nonsuit thus entered was characterized as involuntary, since the plaintiff
was prompted to file his motion for non-suit by an impending adverse
ruling of the Court, which would have precluded him from recovery.
The Court distinguished this type of non-suit from the voluntary one,
which is usually granted in such situations as when the plaintiff
enters court unprepared, or is taken by surprise by the defendant, or
is not prompted to request a non-suit by a proposed adverse ruling
of the court.
4See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 394 (1913).
5Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939).
6E.g., Crews v. 'Woods, 59 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1952); Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., supra note 5; J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.,
infra note 7.
7118 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39 (1934).
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Although section 54.09 of Florida Statutes 1959 does not expressly state which type of non-suit it creates, it has generally been
held that the statute authorizes both the voluntary and the involuntary non-suit.8
LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS UPON THE USE OF NON-SUIT

The absolute right to a non-suit as reflected by an early Florida
case 9 has been subject to increasing qualifications and limitations. A
definite trend has been established by the courts to develop means
of restricting the use of the non-suit. These devices bear careful
analysis in order to formulate some rules as to when and under what
circumstances a non-suit, either voluntary or involuntary, will be
available to the plaintiff.
Language is found in Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.O
that lays a basis for the first real rule seeking to restrict the use of
the non-suit. The defendant demurred to the complaint and made
a motion for final judgment. The plaintiff moved for and received
a dismissal that the court said was similar to the motion to take a
non-suit. At a later date, however, the court, upon motion by the
defendant, reinstated the original suit. The question on appeal arose
from the plaintiff's objection to reinstatement of the suit, on the
ground of his absolute right to a non-suit. The Supreme Court, in
affirming the lower court's holding, laid the basis for the development
and refinement of an express rule upon which the right to a non-suit
is conditioned: "We are of the opinion that such a ruling was 'preclusive of a recovery by the plaintiff,' the judge thereby having held
that the facts alleged, even if proven, were insufficient in law to
justify a recovery by the plaintiff."" In this case the plaintiff had
no cause of action, since the facts, even if proved, were insufficient
at law; he was therefore precluded from recovery and had no absolute right to a non-suit.
Crews v. Woods12 presents a more refined analysis of the rule
applied in Hartquist. A definite limitation on the use of the non-suit
was the result of this analysis. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
8E.g., Crews v. Woods, supra note 6; Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
infra note 10; Pitt v. Abrams, infra note 9.
DPitt v. Abrams, 103 Fla. 1022, 139 So. 152 (1931).
10139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939).
1id. at 346, 190 So. at 540.
1259 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1952).
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motion for non-suit pursuant to the judge's announced intention to
render summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense.
In reaching its decision the Supreme Court said:1 3
"Hartquist . . . distinguished between compulsory non-suits

necessitated by an adverse ruling which was preclusive of recovery only because the plaintiff failed in that particular suit
to prove his cause of action, and those in which the adverse
ruling was preclusive of recovery under any circumstances on
the cause of action stated."
The Court held that the facts of this case fell within the distinction made in Hartquist because the plaintiff's cause was barred by
the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff was therefore precluded
from recovery under any circumstances on the cause of action stated.
Whether a strictly voluntary non-suit is bound by the above rule
is not entirely clear from the Hartquist and Crews cases. Each dealt
with a non-suit that had been taken pursuant to an adverse ruling
of the court, thus placing the non-suit in the involuntary category;
this category itself played an integral part in the formulation of
the restriction. By supposition, then, this rule seemingly would
not apply to the strictly voluntary non-suit, since it is not taken
pursuant to an adverse ruling of the court. Hartquist confirms this
supposition in its discussion of the absolute right of a plaintiff to a
voluntary non-suit but a somewhat less complete right in regard to an
involuntary one.' 4 This interpretation seems to adopt the common
law view of an absolute right to a voluntary non-suit but then to
restrict the use of Florida's creation of the involuntary non-suit to
any situation in which the plaintiff would be "precluded under any
circumstances" from recovery on the cause of action stated.
Welgoss v. End,15 a recent district court of appeal case, suggests
a somewhat different test directed at limiting the "absolute" right
to a non-suit. This test necessarily includes the two examples set out
above and appears to engulf the rule itself, except that here the
test is developed in relation to the voluntary non-suit and is apparently extended to include it. The plaintiff, before trial, requested
a voluntary non-suit. The defendant petitioned for and received a
13Id. at 527.

'4139 Fla. at 345, 190 So. at 540.
15112 So.2d 390 (3d D.G.A. Fla. 1959).
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dismissal of the plaintiff's case with prejudice. The Court reasoned
that the cause upon which the non-suit was requested was not "on
trial" as prescribed by a literal reading of section 54.09 of the Florida
Statutes, and therefore at the pre-trial stage there was no right to
a non-suit.
More basic questions than that of the validity of the test submitted by Welgoss arise when the context of the decision is analyzed.
Since this case was a proceeding in equity, two questions are apparent:
(1) Is non-suit even applicable, so that the "on trial" test could be
said to be a real limitation; and (2) can the non-suit be employed in
equity actions? The Court said that "the provisions of §54.09 .. .
have been applied generally in law actions," and continued that,
assuming that the statute could apply to equity, the cause was still
not "on trial."16 Thus Welgoss is neither authority for the "on trial"
restriction on non-suit nor is it authority for Florida's position on
the application of non-suit in equity proceedings. It does, however,
indicate judicial opinion in the area, since it was the first Florida
case to make a literal interpretation of section 54.09 in extending
non-suit only to those causes that are "on trial." The Supreme Court
could have, based upon the facts, made such a distinction in Hartquist and Crews, but it failed to do so.
Welgoss was also the first case to indicate, even though negatively,
that a non-suit could possibly be extended to equity, although from
the words of the opinion it cannot be determined upon which
theory the holding was based. An explanation generally offered,
which has favored restriction of non-suit to law cases only, is that
throughout the years non-suit has been applicable only in law and
7
that by this common law restriction it has no application to equity.
Another basis upon which the restriction of non-suit to law actions
might lie, even though the rules that create non-suit lie within
the section of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to both
law and equity, is that section 54.09 refers to non-suit being taken
before the jury leaves the bar; and this presupposes an action in law,
not equity, which, except in cases of advisory juries, has no jury trial.
Lynch v. Linden,' another recent district court of appeals case,
sheds considerable doubt upon the application of non-suit to equity,
at 390-91.
e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888, 891
(1932) (dictum, by implication); Welgoss v. End, supra note 15 (semble); 30 FLA.
STAT. ANN. 712 (1956), citing Arnow and Brown, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 125, 137 (1954).
18115 So.2d 91 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
26Id.

'7See,
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while at the same time it suggests further judicial thinking on the
restriction of the non-suit. In denying a motion for non-suit, dismissal,
and discontinuance in this equity action, the court ruled that "nonsuit . .. without prejudice [would not lie], since defendants had ac-

quired substantial rights to be heard on bill and answer."1 It is
interesting to note that the court did not base its holding upon the
fact that a non-suit did not lie from an action in equity, nor did it
even consider non-suit beyond the above quoted passage; it based
its decision upon the "substantial rights" acquired by the defendant
to have his cause determined. The court then cited Welgoss v. End,
Nystrom v. Nystrom, 20 and Muller v. Maxcy,2 1 all equity cases, without further explanation. Since Welgoss was cited, the natural question arises as to which basis of that opinion the court sought to
adopt. Since the Lynch case was a proceeding in equity, perhaps the
court adopted the theory of Welgoss that non-suits have generally
applied only to law actions, suggesting that this would thereby preclude the non-suit in this instance. This would strongly imply that
as a rule non-suits are inapplicable to equity. On the other hand,
from the facts of the case 22 the right to non-suit could have been
denied, since the cause was not yet "on trial"; the court would
thereby have strongly implied that non-suit, upon meeting the proper
requirements, could apply to equity actions. If this latter suggestion
is correct, a further limitation may have been developed upon a
plaintiff's right to a non-suit. This limitation could be applied under
any circumstances wherein the defendant had gained a substantial
right to have his cause determined. Thus the plaintiff's "absolute"
right to a non-suit would ultimately be placed solely within the discretion of the trial court judge in his interpretation of "substantial
rights."
In the opinion rendered on rehearing the court dropped all reference to the Welgoss case and seemingly based it per curiam holding
on the "substantial rights" idea, which was lifted exclusively from
the Muller and Nystrom cases and which, if this per curiam opinion
supersedes the original holding, in part helps to explain an otherwise confusing result.23 From the fact that the court based the major
191bid.
20105 So.2d 605 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).

2174 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1954).
22Here the defendant filed a motion for final decree on bill and answer, from
which the plaintiff requested and received a non-suit.
23Fla. Rule 1.11 (c), applying both to law and equity to give any party a right
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part of its opinion upon Muller and Nystrom, neither of which discussed the principles of non-suit or its application in equity, it might
be suggested that the denial of non-suit in Lynch v. Lynch turned
upon purely equitable principles and that the citation of Welgoss
was a mistake, later rectified by the per curiam opinion rendered on
rehearing.
As revealed by the Florida cases concerning the restrictions upon
the "absolute" right to take a non-suit, it appears that involuntary nonsuits will not be allowed in situations in which the plaintiff is "precluded under any circumstances" from recovery on the cause of action
stated. It is doubtful that this will apply to the voluntary non-suit,
to which the plaintiff may have an absolute right. If, however, litigation is in pretrial stages when the voluntary non-suit is filed, the
somewhat dubious "on trial" literal interpretation of section 54.09
may preclude it from being granted. The "substantial rights of the
defendant" test flies in the face of the absolute right of the plaintiff
to a non-suit; and this language will probably be restricted to its
function in equity, where, by the general weight of authority, the
concept of non-suit is not applicable. If the trend to restrict and
qualify non-suit continues, there is no real limit, short of abrogating
the concept, to a court's ability to formulate doctrinal restrictions
based upon the policy of the substantial right of the defendant to
have his cause adjudicated with the least possible hindrance.
THE EFFECT OF NON-SUIT

Reinstatingthe Cause of Action
Not only do the restrictions and limitations upon the right of
non-suit fall into an unsettled area of Florida law but within this
area falls also the question of the plaintiff's alternatives after he has
taken a non-suit. On this point the Supreme Court in Whitaker v.
Wright stated: "The trial court has jurisdiction within proper time
(certainly during the same term) to set aside and vacate an order
of nonsuit, and especially where no final judgment has been entered
thereon." 24 The Court also quoted from Corpus Juris to the effect
to move for judgment on the pleadings, was construed in these two equity cases

in conjunction with Fla. Equity Rule 3.13, providing for an express amount of
time within which to take testimony, to create a "substantial right of which the
defendants could not be deprived except upon clear grounds of equity and right."
Muller v. Maxcy, 74 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1954).
24100 Fla. 282, 287, 129 So. 889, 891 (1930).
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that the general rule is that a motion to set aside a non-suit or
judgment of dismissal and reinstate the case rests in the sound
discretion of the court. The Court reasoned that since the record
failed to show that a final judgment was ever entered on the nonsuit, there was never a final disposition of the case and that it was
still pending at the time of the motion for reinstatement. As indicated by the above language, the Court did not wish to rule expressly that if final judgment had been entered the cause could not
have been reinstated; nor was the Court required to make a ruling
on the importance of the same term of the court as a prerequisite to
reinstatement, since the motion was within the same term as the
original action.
In 1933 the Supreme Court in Seaboard Oil Co. v. Chalk "5 further
considered the problems presented by Whitaker v. Wright. The
plaintiff asked for and received a non-suit and ninety days within
which to prepare a bill of exceptions for review. Later his motion
to set aside the order of non-suit and reinstate the cause of action
was granted by the trial judge, and the defendant made this ruling
a point of objection on appeal, arguing that the court, by entry of
final judgment on the non-suit, had lost jurisdiction of the matter.
The Supreme Court held that although the order of non-suit was
final in its nature so as to support a writ of error, 26 the trial court had
the power to vacate the order and judgment. Thus this case seems
to clarify the doubt raised by the Whitaker case in allowing a nonsuit to be vacated regardless of its entry as a final judgment.
State ex rel. Croker v. Chillingworth further clarified the questions left in doubt in both of the prior cases and formulated the
27
existing Florida law in this area:
"After a plaintiff has suffered the dismissal of his cause of
action, the court is without further jurisdiction and has no
right to render any judgment in his favor nor any judgment
against him. The parties are out of court for every purpose
other than to carry the order into effect, or to vacate or modify
the same; and after the expiration of the term . . . the court
has no power to reinstate the cause."
Fla. 387, 150 So. 605 (1933).
26This necessity of a final judgment as a basis for an appeal is no longer required. FLA. STAT. §59.02 (1) (1959).
27106 Fla. 323, 327, 143 So. 346, 347 (1932).
25112
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Thus the Florida law on reinstating a cause of action pursuant to
a non-suit seems to be that it is within the power of a court to
vacate its own judgment of non-suit, whether entered in the form of
a final judgment or not, by virtue of the court's inherent power to
modify or vacate its own judgments at its discretion. Once the term
of the court expires, however, apparently it loses jurisdiction of the
matter and is without discretion to vacate or modify even interlocutory orders of non-suit and reinstate the cause. The result, then, of
taking a non-suit in this area is fictional, since the power to vacate
an order comes not from the rules governing non-suit but from the
inherent powers of the court itself.
Bar to Subsequent Suits on the Same Cause of Action
The Court in the Chillingworth case went further in the area of
non-suit than just to grant a motion for writ of prohibition to prevent the trial judge from reinstating a cause dismissed in the term
prior; it also laid the basis for still another unsettled question in28
volving non-suit in Florida. The Court stated:
"While a judgment dismissing an action at law not involving the merits [as was the case here] is not a bar to a subsequent action and the same rule applies also to a judgment
[of non-suit] ....

such judgment is nevertheless a sufficient dis-

position of the cause then pending to deprive the court of
jurisdiction to reinstate it after the expiration of the term ...

"

The Court held that although the lower court was without jurisdiction to reinstate the cause of action, its holding was without prejudice
to any right the plaintiff may have had under the law to proceed with
the suit as an original new action. Thus the Court suggested that
even if the term of a court has expired and a motion to vacate is
not proper, a plaintiff, if the order of non-suit is not an adjudication
upon the merits of the case, is not barred from a subsequent suit
on the same cause of action.
A complex problem is thus presented. When a plaintiff who receives a non-suit brings a new suit on his original cause of action,
will the trial court or the appellate court look to the technical form
in which the non-suit is entered in order to distinguish between a
281d. at 327, 143 So. at 347.
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mere arrest of the trial and a bar to a subsequent suit? Or will it
look to the basic classification of the non-suit as voluntary or involuntary? Or are these two questions but labels used by the judge in
applying what may be the real test - the legal effect of the judgment
in settling the rights and duties of the parties? Before these questions
are considered, perhaps the section of the Chillingworth case that indicates that only a non-suit that is not an adjudication upon the
merits of the case may be brought again as an original new action
should be reappraised. This reappraisal is especially necessary in
view of the fact that some Florida cases suggest that a judgment of
non-suit is not a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. 29
One commentator, in challenging the validity of non-suit in Florida,
especially the involuntary non-suit, rests his conclusion solely upon
the fact that the plaintiff can sue again and again on the same cause
of action, using this privilege vexatiously,30 without mentioning a

possible qualification that the non-suit, if an adjudication upon the
merits of the case, may be res judicata.
Broad statements to the effect that non-suits are not a bar to a
new action on the same set of facts may be the result of a confusion
in terms between the purely common law usage and Florida case
decisions. A non-suit at common law was voluntary only and was a
dismissal of a cause without an adjudication upon the merits; consequently there was no bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause
of action.31 Florida case law, although recognizing the voluntary
character of the non-suit, further subdivided it in accordance with
the circumstances under which it was taken. Thus courts and writers,
while correctly speaking of the non-suit as voluntary in its inception,
may fail to make the further necessary distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary non-suit adhered to by the majority of the
Florida cases. The common law rule applicable to voluntary nonsuits is recognized by the Florida Supreme Court as applicable to
any dismissal of a cause of action: "[A]

dismissal . . . not involving

the merits of a pending case, is not res adjudicata of the controversy,
nor can it be pleaded in bar of a subsequent suit on the same subjectmatter." 32 Although this general holding may be applicable to the
29E.g., J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 118 Fla. 259, 159
So. 39 (1934); National Broadway Bank v. Lesley, 31 Fla. 56, 12 So. 525 (1893).
3OWigginton, New Florida Common Law Rules, 3 U. FriL. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1950);
see 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. 713 (1956).
3aSlocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
32Hassenteufel v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 52 So.2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1951).
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effect of the voluntary non-suit in Florida, the legal effect of Florida's
involuntary non-suit must be considered as a possible adjudication of
the merits of the case and thus a bar to further action on the same
cause.
The Court in J. Schnarr& Co. v. Virginia-CarolinaChemical Corp.
held that the doctrine that non-suit is not a judgment on the merits
and does not therefore act as res judicata applies only to the voluntary non-suit that is not a final judgment. As to involuntary non-suit,
the Court said that "a judgment is upon the merits when it amounts
to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of
the parties based upon the ultimate facts disclosed by the pleadings
...
,,33Thus, although the Schnarr case did not base its holding
upon a distinction as to the technical form in which the non-suit was
entered, in holding that the non-suit in litigation was of the involuntary type and therefore a judgment on the merits it did extensively
consider the legal effect of the order in settlement of the issues of
the controversy.
Another avenue of approach to the question of when an involuntary non-suit will amount to a judgment on the merits has been indicated by the Florida cases that suggest a close analogy between the
technical entry of a final judgment and an adjudication on the merits
of the case. One Supreme Court decision held that "a judgment is
final when it adjudicates the merits of the cause and disposes of
the pending action, leaving nothing further to be done but the
execution of the judgment."34 A line of Florida cases, in considering
the question of appeal from a non-suit when appeal could be had only
from judgments final in nature, discuss in great detail the technical
form required of the entry of non-suit before the order can constitute
a final judgment. The Supreme Court, in holding the non-suit not to
be a final judgment, has said, "It does not purport to declare the
sentence of the law upon the entry of the nonsuit, which is an essential element of a final judgment."' 5 Another decision stated that
an entry of non-suit is not final without something more than the
mere entry of non-suit. 36 Spiker v. Hester, a 1931 decision, providedSo. 89, 42 (1934).
34Howard v. Ziegler, 40 So.2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1949).
35Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co., 57 Fla. 118, 119, 49 So. 501
33118 Fla. 259, 267, 159

(1909).
3aState ex rel. L. & L. Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bars, 129 Fla. 668, 176 So. 756
(1937).
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the classic form for the entry of non-suit that is considered a final
judgment: 37
"'"[P]laintiff being solemnly called came not, neither was his
suit further prosecuted, whereupon plaintiff suffered a nonsuit, and it is therefore considered by the Court that the plaintiff take nothing by his writ and that the defendant go hence
without day and recover of the plaintiff his costs ....' "
Citing Spiker v. Hester as the classic form for entry of final judgment,
the Supreme Court in Strong v. City of Winter Park38 refused an
appeal from a judgment of non-suit, stating that no final judgment
appeared in the record. The non-suit requested was taken pursuant
to the announced intention of the trial judge to direct a verdict for
the defendant and was therefore involuntary, although the court
failed to make the distinction. Thus, if the analogy between final
judgments and adjudication on the merits be drawn, this case is a
possible example, Schnarr to the contrary, of an involuntary nonsuit that may not be a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause
of action, since it lacked finality of judgment in the entry of the nonsuit and thereby reflected the trial judge's intention not to finally
adjudicate the cause.
Goldring v. Reid,39 a very early Florida non-suit case, reached a
similar conclusion by way of dictum in drawing an analogy between
the technical entry of an order of non-suit and an order as res judicata. Although the non-suit in question was involuntary, the entry
was merely that the "plaintiff be and is nonsuited"; and the Court
did not grant an appeal, saying, "The ordering of the nonsuit . . .
would indicate that by such a judgment the cause is not disposed
of on its merits, so as to preclude another proper action on the merits
of the cause. ' '4 0 Although the formal, technical entry of the non-suit
may at one time have played a major role in the analysis by the courts
of the question of when a non-suit will adjudicate the merits of the
case, the most logical approach seems to be that of the Schnarr case.
In other words, an involuntary non-suit taken pursuant to a ruling
adverse to the plaintiff precluding him from recovery is, in effect,
Fla. 286, 289, 135 So. 502 (1931).
38115 Fla. 228, 155 So. 652 (1934).
37101

3960 Fla.
4Olbid.

78, 81, 53 So. 503, 504 (1910).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss1/3

12

Mays: Florida's Unique Dismissal–The Nonsuit
NOTES
an adjudication of the cause, notwithstanding the form of entry of
the non-suit.
A 1957 Supreme Court decision seems to support the Schnarr
case, explaining more fully a possible reason behind the holding:4 '
"'A judgment on the merits does not require a determination
...on [the] controverted facts. It is sufficient if the record
shows that the parties might have had their controversies
determined according to their respective rights if they had
presented all their evidence and the court had applied the
law.' "
The Court in speaking of the policy factors behind Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.35 (b), which provides that dismissals shall act as
adjudications upon the merits, named the policy of final determination
of litigation as the most prevalent force behind such rules. The Court,
however, emphasized the fact that adequate safeguards, such as the
liberal amendment, transfers of action, timely appeals, and voluntary non-suits, are needed and are provided to protect the less surefooted litigant. By all indications, then, this case substantiates the
rule set forth by the Schnarr case -that a voluntary non-suit is not
a bar to a new suit on the same cause of action but that an involuntary non-suit that is an adjudication upon the merits, or by which the
parties might have had their controversies adjudicated, is a bar to
subsequent suits on the same cause of action.
The Right of Appeal
As provided by section 59.05 of Florida Statutes 1959, "When
because of any decision or ruling of the court on the trial of a cause
it becomes necessary for the plaintiff to suffer a non-suit, he may
appeal therefrom .... ." Through the annals of Florida law this
statute, in conjunction with the non-suit statute, 42 has permitted the
non-suiting plaintiff a right of appeal under certain none-too-settled
conditions. A survey of Florida cases in this area, together with a
certain amount of speculation and legal hypothesis, is required in
order to determine under what circumstances the right of appeal
exists.
4lHinchee v. Fisher, 93 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1957).
42FLA. STAT. §54.09 (1959).
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A line of Florida cases seeks to limit the appeal provided by section 59.05 to those entries of non-suit that import or constitute a
final judgment. 43 The theory is advanced in Mizell Live Stock Co. v.
J. J. McCaskill Co. 44 that common law required, as a prerequisite to
review, both finality of cause and the element of involuntariness.
Section 1697 of the Florida General Statutes of 1906, 45 according to
this decision, did away with the element of involuntariness, but the
finality of action requirement was expressly retained by section 169 1,46
which the non-suit appeal statute did not supersede. The non-suit
from which appeal was sought in the Mizell case was involuntary,
"suffered" pursuant to an adverse ruling of the Court; however, the
plaintiff was denied appeal because the order in its technical form
failed to denote finality of action. Goldring v. Reid, in relying upon
Mizell, held that an order that "the plaintiff be and is hereby nonsuited ... is not such a final disposition of the action as that it will
support a writ of error.- 47 The case indicates that, in addition to
the order of non-suit, other expressions should be entered adjudicating that the action at bar is at an end. This non-suit was also involuntary; the plaintiff was required to suffer a non-suit by reason
of certain rulings of the trial court.
The section of the Florida General Statutes referred to in the
Mizell case and upon which Goldring v. Reid was decided, which
allowed appeal only from final judgments, was amended in 1941 to
read: "Appeals in cases at law lie only from final judgments, except
as specified in §59.03, 59.04, and 59.05."41 Thus it would seem that
since 1941 the question of the finality of judgment should play no
part in appeal from a non-suit, since this appeal, pursuant to section
59.05, is now an express exception to the required final judgment.49
An analysis of the case law since 1941 has, however, failed to reveal any
degree of unanimity in the recognition of this statutory change, and
appeals are still denied upon the basis that the order of non-suit
lacks language to indicate that a final judgment has been entered.
43E.g., Goldring v. Reid, 60 Fla. 78, 53 So. 503 (1910); Mizell Live Stock Co.
v. J. J. McCaskill Co., infra note 44; Ropes v. Eldridge, 39 Fla. 47, 21 So. 570 (1897).
4457 Fla. 118,49 So. 501 (1909).
45Now FLA. STAT. §59.05 (1959).
46Nov FLA. STAT. §59.02 (1959).
4760 Fla. 78, 79, 53 So. 503, 504 (1910).
48FLA. STAT.

§59.02 (1) (1959).

49 See Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Insurance Agents Finance Corp.,
46 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1950).
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A 1948 Florida case,50 although granting appeal from a final judgment, indicated that a non-suit without an order of dismissal was
not sufficient to support a writ of error, quoting Goldring v. Reid,
which was decided prior to the 1941 statutory change.
In Mullis v. City of Miamisl the Court took a peculiar approach
to the question in granting an appeal from what it labeled a voluntary non-suit, without question of final judgment. On its face this
case, in allowing an appeal from a non-suit pursuant to section
59.05 even though it did not constitute a final judgment, might
seem to have accepted the 1941 statutory change. However, upon
close analysis the circumstances indicate that the non-suit was entered after the judge expressed his intention to direct a verdict for
the defendant and was therefore involuntary. Thus, while the case
does not stand for an appeal from a purely voluntary non-suit, it
does not expressly require any technical form in which the judgment
of non-suit must be entered in order to form a basis for appeal.
In City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer,52 another peculiar non-suit appeals case, the Court allowed an appeal from what it labeled a
voluntary non-suit but which was taken pursuant to an adverse
ruling of the trial court and was therefore involuntary. To confuse
matters further, this case, which was decided before the 1941 statutory change and in the face of much precedent to the contrary, made
no mention of the final judgment requirement for appeal, as prescribed by the Mizell case, but based its decision purely upon policy
53
factors:
"The purpose of permitting appeals like this from voluntary
nonsuits is to permit the plaintiff in a case at law to have important legal questions, arising during the trial of his case,
presented to and decided by the appellate court, without his
being required to suffer the conclusiveness of a final judgment
against him on the merits."
By the language of both this case and Mullis the Court, in labeling
the non-suit as voluntary, seemed to be speaking of non-suit as construed at common law, voluntarily taken at the insistence of the
plaintiff; but it failed to distinguish between this concept and the
-0Schwenk v. Jacob, 160 Fla. 33, 33 So.2d 592 (1948).
5160 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1952).
52107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
531d. at 375, 144 So. at 891.
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further distinction between the voluntary and involuntary non-suits
drawn by prior cases in Florida. This omission often makes analysis
and attempted formulation of rules difficult.
As a result of the change effected by the Florida Statutes of 1941,
expressly eliminating the requirement of a final judgment for appeal
if taken pursuant to section 59.05, the question, ignored in the Mullis
and Jacksonville cases, of the right to appeal from a purely voluntary
non-suit interlocutory in character arises. The Florida courts have
refused to entertain appeal from a purely voluntary non-suit as
classified from the facts of the cases, and not from a possibly incorrect label applied by the court. Since a final judgment seemingly
is no longer required to constitute a basis for such an appeal, apparently this would imply right of appeal from voluntary non-suit
also. A 1952 Supreme Court decision, Crews v. Woods,54 offered by
way of dictum a possible solution of this question, although a full
explanation is yet to be found in Florida case law. This case indicates
that since the words of the non-suit appeal statute provide for appeal
only when the plaintiff has been caused to "suffer" a non-suit and
not when he voluntarily dismisses his cause, appeal will necessarily
lie only from involuntary non-suit. If this construction of section
59.05 is accepted, a possible explanation of why the requirement of
a final judgment is still demanded by some courts in the denial of
appeal from a voluntary non-suit may be suggested. The voluntary
non-suit, since it does not comply with the wording of section 59.05,
would not fall under the express exceptions to section 59.02 (1), which
requires a final judgment as a basis for appeal. If this literal construction of section 59.05 is not adhered to and the statute is construed
as granting the right to appeal from any non-suit, there is no logical
reason why, since the statutory change of 1941, a voluntary non-suit
cannot provide the basis for an appeal.
The Jacksonville case advanced a theory that has been subsequently
extended to limit further the right of appeal from a non-suit. 55 The
Court indicated that a non-suit appeal could be had only from a
decision of the court "on the trial" of the cause, which is a literal
reading of section 59.05. This seems to be the general trend today.
The cases indicate that rulings on pleadings, even when granted as
non-suits, do not fit the express terms for appeal as set out by section
5459 So.2d 526, 527 (Fla. 1952).
55E.g., Lee v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 113 Fla. 472, 152 So. 17 (1934); Ramsey

v. Aronson, inIra note 56 (semble).
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59.05 and are therefore not appealable until final judgment is entered.
In so holding, Ramsey v. Aronson,5 6 a district court of appeal case,
denied appeal from a non-suit granted after an order by the trial
judge granting summary judgment, ruling that appeal from a nonsuit pursuant to section 59.05 requires the decision of the court to be
"on the trial." In referring to the Jacksonville case, which was said
to grant appeal from a voluntary non-suit, the court further explained
that the non-suit was taken during the trial of the case, whereas the
present case was not yet on trial. In denying petition for rehearing,
however, the holding was completely distorted when the court said:
"The court adheres to its original opinion that the judgment of
voluntary non-suit sought to be reviewed in this cause is not a final
judgment from which an appeal would lie."5 7 Unless the opinion on
the petition for rehearing is to be completely disregarded and the
extent of the holding is to be that the non-suit was not taken while
"on the trial" of the cause and is therefore not subject to review, the
Ramsey case makes little sense. Logically, the opinion on the petition for rehearing would be the basis of the holding, and calling
this non-suit "not a final judgment from which an appeal would
lie," in view of the exceptions to the requirements for appeal by
section 59.02 (1) and the involuntary character of this non-suit, seems
erroneous and unjustifiable.
The Florida case law provides no unanimity of opinion on the
question of when an appeal based on section 59.05 will be allowed.
As gathered from the early cases decided in accordance with a Florida
statute permitting appeals only from final judgments, the non-suit
appeal statute was held subordinate, and only those non-suits entered
in the technical form of a final judgment were appealable. By the
1941 statutory change, however, the non-suit appeals statute was expressly made an exception. This change provided two avenues of
approach to the question of which non-suits can form the basis for
appeal. One theory is that the statutory change allows appeal from
both voluntary and involuntary non-suits, construing section 59.05
as not distinguishing between the two and an express exception to
the statute requiring that appeals lie only from final judgments. The
other approach is that only those non-suits that literally conform to
the wording of section 59.05 are exceptions to the general rule requiring finality of judgment for appeal, and this expressly eliminates
5699

So.2d 643 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).

571d. at 645.
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voluntary non-suits not "suffered" pursuant to an adverse ruling of
the court. Later cases have taken the latter position but have substantiated it only by inference in their general refusal to allow appeal
from voluntary non-suits and have relied almost exclusively on the
erroneous conclusion that appeals from non-suits lie only from final
judgments, without further explanation as to the literal construction
of section 59.05 as offered by the Crews case.
CONCLUSION

Since the federal rules expressly allow the plaintiff a dismissal
when in the course of the suit it is felt that the dismissal will not
unduly hinder the deTendant, and since the Florida rules have adopted
a similar provision, not only in form but also in practice, the validity
of further aid to the plaintiff through the confusing concept of nonsuit is open to serious criticism. The additional clause of Florida
Rule 1.35 (b) creates the non-suit, a device that is both contradictory
to and inconsistent with Florida Rule 1.35 (a), which provides for
a voluntary dismissal if it is filed before the defendant's answer or
motion for summary judgment is served. This non-suit device may
allow a dismissal without prejudice to the plaintiff, even if taken
after the defendant's answer or motion for summary judgment, as
long as the motion is requested as a non-suit and not filed as a voluntary dismissal.
The courts have recognized the tremendous advantage allowed the
plaintiff by his right to non-suit and have constantly been in the process of qualifying and restricting the use of this concept until the circumstances under which non-suit will be allowed and its effects are
not at all certain. Thus, although the theory of non-suit is very much
in existence today, a reasonable prediction as to when it may be
finally rendered judicially ineffective cannot be made.
The contest now seems to be between the courts and the legislature to see which will be the first to abolish non-suit completely. A
Senate bill s was introduced in April, 1959, to repeal sections 54.09 and
59.05, which would have brought about its complete abolition. This
bill was sponsored by the Circuit Judges' Association, which felt that
the trial judge could handle the situation more equitably under the
58"Senate Bill 118, By Senator Cross- (by request): A bill to be entitled, An Act
relating to non-suits; repealing Section 54.09, Florida Statutes, relating to time for
non-suits; and repealing Section 59.05, Florida Statutes, providing for appeal from
order of non-suit."
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